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Abstract
This essay proposes a conception of citizenship that highlights its political aspects. Based on the work
of Balibar, Rancière, and Biesta, it is argued that democratic citizenship education must include the
education of equality. This means that students must have the opportunity to experience not only the
membership aspect of citizenship that subjects them to the state but also the democratic aspect of citizenship that positions them as equals to each other and capable of political intervention. The increasing emphasis in state policies on the membership aspect of citizenship must be counterbalanced by an
emphasis in education on the democratic aspect of citizenship: the education of equality. The proposed conception of citizenship can be used to evaluate approaches to citizenship education.
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Introduction
Citizenship is a contested concept. As Mike Bottery (2003)
explains, citizenship involves, fundamentally, the relationship
between individuals and a political body, and “at the present time
the political body defining the terms and boundaries of citizenship is something called ‘the nation state’” (p. 102). However, the
nation state is a historically contingent, and not a necessary or
self-evident, form of political organization. “A growing awareness
of this artificiality and of its claims to citizen allegiance is increasingly one of its weaknesses” (p. 104). For example, transnational
people such as the Kurds, the Roma, and the Saami are members
of nations that stretch across multiple states. For transnational
people, an allegiance to the nation does not map onto an allegiance to the state in which they happen to live.1 Some of the
indigenous peoples of North, Central, and South America are also
transnational in the sense that their nations span the borders of
current states such as Canada and the United States or the United
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States and Mexico. In addition, the concept of citizenship is
problematic for indigenous people upon whom the current
political body that defines citizenship has been imposed. For
example, Marie Battiste and Helen Semaganis (2002) write that
Canada’s history of treaty federalism—that is, of “written
[nation-to-nation] agreements between First Nations and the
Imperial Crown” (p. 99)—explains why Canadian citizenship,
defined as the mutual relation between individuals and the
current political body of the Canadian state, is highly problematic. “As protected nations under their prerogative treaties,
Aboriginal peoples were never subject to the authority of the
imperial Parliament, but remained as sovereign nations under
the prerogatives of the Crown rather than as subjects of the
Crown” (p. 100).
In spite of its contested nature, the concept of citizenship has
not disappeared from either political or educational theory. In fact,
Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman (1994) observe that, after the
concept of citizenship went out of favor in the 1970s, it saw a
resurgence in the 1990s. Scholarship on citizenship and citizenship
education has continued since then, which perhaps can be
explained by a combination of factors such as low voter turnouts
and concerns about civic disengagement, increasing cultural
diversity and concerns about social cohesion, and growing
awareness of large-scale problems such as climate change that
require commitments of individual citizens and larger political
bodies alike (see Kymlicka & Norman, 1994, p. 352).
The contemporary scholarship on citizenship education
seems to be driven in particular by the desire to foster individual
autonomy as well as contribute to the social and political fabric.
However, concerns have been raised about education’s emphasis on
the personal and the social and the lack of emphasis on the political
aspects of citizenship. Joel Westheimer and Joseph Kahne (2004),
for example, charge that “a vast majority of school-based service
learning and community service programs embrace a vision of
citizenship devoid of politics; they often promote service but not
democracy” (p. 243). This concern echoes Kymlicka and Norman’s
(1994) earlier observation that
in the absence of some account of legitimate and illegitimate ways to
promote or enforce good citizenship, many works on citizenship
reduce to a platitude: namely, society would be better if the people in it
were nicer and more thoughtful. (p. 369)

In this essay I propose a way of understanding citizenship
that places political aspects firmly in the center. For this framing
I draw from philosophical work that I describe as post-Marxist:
recent work by the French philosophers Etienne Balibar and
Jacques Rancière.2 In particular I am interested in how these
thinkers talk about the role of equality in citizenship and politics
today. First, I describe and explain Rancière’s view of democratic
citizenship as always focused on the disruption of the existing
social order. I expand Rancière’s views with Balibar’s conception
of citizenship as a dialectic between inequality (i.e., citizenship as
status accorded by the state) and equality (the enactment of
citizenship in holding the state to account). From these
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theoretical perspectives, I draw the conclusion that citizenship-
as-equality should be the focus of citizenship education today.
Finally, I examine two cases of citizenship education curriculum
and policy from British Columbia, Canada, to see how they hold
up under this theoretical lens.

Democracy, Institutions, and Disruption
The work of Rancière affords a particularly critical lens for
thinking about questions of democracy and citizenship in education. I appreciate Rancière’s (2002) uncompromising insistence on
equality as a premise, an axiom, not a goal:
Equality is not a goal that governments and societies could succeed in
reaching. To pose equality as a goal is to hand it over to the
pedagogues of progress, who widen endlessly the distance they promise
they will abolish. Equality is a presupposition, an initial axiom—or it
is nothing. (p. 223)

organizers of deliberation hold less rigid views of their own work than
might be inferred from classic philosophical texts that define
deliberation as the essence of democracy, that equate it with
reasonableness or rationality, and that overlook situations in which
more confrontational tactics are appropriate. (n.p.)

Rancière’s counterintuitive stance on equality is sometimes
misunderstood as a refusal or failure to acknowledge the seriousness of social and, especially, material inequality. This is a significant misunderstanding, indeed, as Rancière’s work highlights the
scandal between the inequality of social conditions and the
equality of consciousness—or, in Rancière’s (1987/1991) terms, the
“equality of intelligence”—that all men and women share. Todd
May (2009) explains that “intelligence” in this Rancièrean sense is
quite straightforward:
We are, unless we are deeply damaged in some way, capable of
creating meaningful lives with one another, talking with one another,
understanding one another, and reasoning about ourselves and our
situations. Our social and political contexts, while sometimes difficult
and complex, do not involve essential mysteries that we are in
principle incapable of comprehending without the assistance of a
savant of some sort. In short, we are capable of formulating and
carrying out our lives with one another. (p. 7)

In positing equality as “initial axiom” (Rancière, 2002, p. 223),
Rancière inverts the usual order of observing inequality today and
aiming for equality tomorrow; instead, he argues, we should
presuppose equality between human beings and seek to verify it in
our actions. Taking equality as presupposition means we don’t ask
how we may help people achieve the equality of consciousness that
would allow them to reflect on their situation intelligently; rather,
we ask what new possibilities emerge when people are treated as if
they already have equality of consciousness and already reflect
intelligently upon their situation (see Ruitenberg, 2008). I will
return to these points.
I have also been inspired by Rancière’s insistence on the
centrality of disagreement in the democratic process, especially
because, certainly in Canada, there is a strong desire for agreement
and consensus in education, and the dominant approach seems to
be deliberative. Deliberative conceptions of democracy and
citizenship education range from those that emphasize the
Habermasian ideal speech situation and the promotion of
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communicative skills and dispositions for rational deliberation, to
those that acknowledge the messiness of the democratic process
and the need to balance deliberative and more confrontational
approaches. Among the latter and, in my view, more productive
approaches are Nancy Fraser’s (1990) appreciation for the dissenting force of subaltern counterpublics and Iris Marion Young’s
(2001) critical understanding that “individuals and organizations
seeking to undermine injustice and promote justice need both to
engage in discussion with others to persuade them that there are
injustices that ought to be remedied and to protest and engage in
direct action” (p. 689). Peter Levine and Rose Marie Nierras (2007)
supplement Young’s observation with a qualitative study involving
60 interviews with activists and organizers of deliberation. They
find that, in practice,
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In spite of this acknowledgement of disagreement by some
deliberative scholars, I turn to the work of contemporary French
scholars Rancière and Balibar because they emphasize not just the
importance of disagreement but, more particularly, disagreement
about and in the name of citizens’ equality. I discuss this feature of
their work in the next section. For the moment, let me address in
greater detail their conception of political disagreement and
where it occurs.
Like Chantal Mouffe, Rancière argues that disagreement is not
a problem to be overcome in democracy but rather a constitutive
feature of it (see Ruitenberg, 2009). However, I am concerned with
Rancière’s dismissal of the institutions that organize society as
places where democracy and politics by definition do not occur.
Rancière (1995/1999) considers the social order and its institutions
“the police” because this order “defines the allocation of ways of
doing, ways of being, and ways of saying, and sees that . . . bodies
are assigned by name to a particular place and task” (p. 29). He
reserves the name “politics” only for activity that disrupts this
order, that “shifts a body from the place assigned to it or changes a
place’s destination” (p. 30). For Rancière, then, political activity
does not occur within the institutions of any social order, but only
in the disruption of those institutions.
Educational scholar Gert Biesta (2011a) discusses Rancière’s
insistence on democracy and politics as taking place only in the
moments of disruption of any established order. Biesta chooses to
combine the views of Rancière with those of Mouffe so that we can
see democratic politics taking place also in moments of disagreement and disruption within the institutions of a given order, not
only in, as Rancière would have it, the moments of establishing a
new order: “Whereas for Mouffe there is democratic ‘work’ to be
done within the domain of politics, that is, within a particular
political order, Rancière’s anarchic approach in a sense denies that
anything politically relevant might happen within the police order”
(Biesta, 2011a, p. 148).
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Balibar (2008) expresses his appreciation for and agreement
with Rancière’s argument that democracy should be understood
as a struggle, that is, as the ongoing “democratization of democracy itself (or of what claims to represent a democratic regime)”
(p. 526). However, Balibar also expresses his disagreement with
what he calls “a neglect of the institutional dimension of democracy” (p. 526). Like Mouffe and Biesta, Balibar believes this
institutional dimension “cannot be left aside because equality also
has to be written in institutions . . . and the democratization of
institutions, including ‘public’ institutions, should not become
confused with the problem of the construction of the sovereign
state” (p. 526).
I agree with Rancière that the moment of the political is the
moment of contestation of the exclusions of a social order, but I
agree with Mouffe that such contestation can happen both within
the institutions and at the borders of that order. Like Balibar, I
believe it is a mistake to leave the institutional dimension out of our
thinking about democracy, even if we emphasize the inevitably
conflictual or agonistic nature of democracy. In this paper, therefore, I examine Balibar’s work on citizenship in order to locate
Rancière’s argument for the centrality of equality and to arrive at a
fuller conception of citizenship to guide the critical evaluation of
concrete citizenship curricula and policies today.
Rancière is more interested in democracy and politics than he
is in citizenship, because he sees the latter concept as constantly
being pulled away from democracy and politics by the forces of the
police order. A recent example of such forces would be the push for
Big Society by the UK government, a policy initiative launched in
2010 that includes measures that “encourage volunteering and
involvement in social action,” “encourage charitable giving and
philanthropy,” and “support the creation and expansion of mutuals,
co-operatives, charities and social enterprises, and support these
groups to have much greater involvement in the running of public
services” (UK Cabinet Office, 2010). This conception of citizenship
as civic involvement is visible as well in a curriculum framework
issued by the British Columbia Ministry of Education (2001) called
Social Responsibility, which I discuss toward the end of the paper.
Rancière (1995/1999) writes about such developments with thinly
disguised contempt:
To those who deplore the loss of republican citizenship, postdemocratic
logic responds by proclaiming generalized citizenship. And so the town
is called on to embody the identity of urban civilization with the
community of the polis animated by its community soul. The
citizen-enterprise is called on to show the identity of their productive
and appropriating energy with the part played in the building of the
community and the putting together of a microcosm of this
community. (p. 114)

It is clear that, for Rancière, if citizenship is interpreted as the civic
spirit of community building, it has little to do with democracy and
politics. Rancière believes citizenship should and can be seen in a
more political way, but it is difficult to keep it from being pulled
back into the police order. In order to explain this, I turn to the
work of Balibar, who has written in greater detail about the concept
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of citizenship and whose analysis helps to understand the opposing
forces of what Rancière calls politics and the police within citizenship itself.

Citizenship as a Dialectic
between Inequality and Equality
Balibar (1988) traces the idea of citizenship historically and
identifies two central aspects that remain in citizenship today:
“Citizenship” . . . has always marked two distinctions: it is bound to
the existence of a state and therefore to a principle of public
sovereignty, and it is bound to the acknowledged exercise of an
individual “capacity” to participate in political decisions. (p. 723)

The first aspect of citizenship Balibar identifies here, that of its tie
to the state, is what he elsewhere calls the “statutory” or legal aspect
by which those who have the status of citizen in a particular state
can be distinguished from those who do not have this status:
By definition, citizenship can only exist where we understand a notion
of city to exist—where fellow citizens and foreigners are clearly
distinguished in terms of rights and obligations in a given space. . . .
In this respect, the modern nation is still, and must still consider itself,
a city. (Balibar, 1996, p. 358)

The very concept of citizenship involves both a bounded space and
the exclusion of those who are noncitizens from agreements of
rights and responsibilities in that space. This first or statutory
aspect of citizenship introduces inequality as it places citizens and
noncitizens living in a given “city” in a hierarchical relation to the
state that will or will not grant them citizenship. This is the
membership aspect of citizenship that outlines one’s rights and
responsibilities in a contract with the state of which and to which
one is (a) subject. Today, since the state is almost always the
nation-state, this is citizenship understood as nationality.
The second aspect of citizenship Balibar (1988) identifies is the
capacity of the individual to participate in public decisions.
Elsewhere he describes this as the aspect of self-constitution, “the
expression of a collective political capacity to constitute the state or
the public space” (Balibar, 1996, p. 364). In other words, where the
statutory aspect of citizenship shows how the citizen is subject to
the state, this constitutive aspect of citizenship shows how the state
is subject to the citizen. “It is this notion,” explains Balibar (1996),
“that provides the link between the idea of citizenship and that of
equality” (p. 364). This second aspect of citizenship emphasizes the
capacity of citizens to create and change the borders of the community to which they belong, and to hold the governance of this
community to account.
Balibar (1996) further explains these two aspects of citizenship in relation to the two conceptions of “the people,” in the first or
hierarchical sense as “community, affiliation or identity” and in the
second or egalitarian sense as “will and egalitarian collective
power” (p. 369). It is important to note that, according to Balibar,
these two aspects are both undeniably present in contemporary
citizenship: the hierarchical or statutory aspect and the egalitarian
democracy & education, vol 23, n-o 1

or constitutive aspect are poles in a permanent dialectic. In a more
recent article, Balibar (2010a) uses the concept of antinomie, a
contradiction of laws or principles, to argue that “citizenship’s
problem, in its various historical figures, with all their enormous
differences, lies in its antinomic relationship to democracy” and
that, from his dialectical perspective, “this kind of antinomy forms
the essential driving force of historical transformations” (pp. 1–2).
Put differently, it is precisely because citizenship involves both
submission to the state and constitution of the state, and because
these statutory and egalitarian aspects are inherently in tension,
that change is possible.
Balibar observes that, today, especially under the influence of
European anxieties about migration, increasing weight is being
placed on the statutory aspects of citizenship. Achieving legal
status in the European Union has been made so difficult that
scholars and media commentators now speak of Fortress Europe
(see Geddes, 2000). This reinforcement of the statutory aspect calls
for a reconsideration of the egalitarian aspect: “By a symmetry
inscribed throughout the history of the concept of citizen, the
emphasis on the statutory and hierarchical aspect of citizenship
allows us to reformulate the question in reference to its egalitarian
aspect” (Balibar, 1996, p. 367). In other words, if the state occupies
itself more with the delimitation of citizenship in the sense of
membership and obligation, citizens should occupy themselves
more with their constitutive powers, their capacity to decide the
borders of the demos and to hold the state to account. Biesta (2011b)
has argued:
Citizenship is not so much a status, something which can be achieved
and maintained, but . . . it should primarily be understood as
something that people continuously do: citizenship as practice. . . .
Citizenship is . . . not an identity that someone can ‘have,’ but first and
foremost a practice of identification . . . with public issues that are of a
common concern. (p. 13)3

Based on Balibar’s analysis, I would modify Biesta’s argument
slightly: While citizenship is both a status and a practice, the
emphasis that nation-states and supranational governments
currently place on the statutory aspect demands a greater focus on
citizenship as a practice of identification with public issues that are
of a common concern.
Rancière (2006) captures these two aspects of citizenship
when he notes that “citizen” can be a political name, but is not
automatically so. “Citizen” can be used to denote a place and role
(status) in the “police order” and, in that mode, the name “citizen”
designates the exclusion of “such and such a part of the population
from citizenship or . . . such and such a domain of collective life
from the reign of civic equality” (p. 301). By contrast, “citizen” can
also be used as a political name—or, more precisely, as the name of
a political activity—and, in that mode, “‘citizen’ opposes the rule of
equality fixed by law and by principle to the inequalities that
characterize ‘men,’ that is, private individuals subjected to the
powers of birth and wealth” (p. 301). The two aspects of the concept
of citizenship thus refer to two types of relation with the state.
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The Need for an Education of Equality Today
Whether one believes, as does Rancière, that equality is inherently
primary and central in democracy and politics, or whether one
believes that a greater emphasis on the egalitarian aspect of
citizenship is needed today to restore a critical balance with the
membership aspect, the end result for citizenship education is
similar: it must emphasize equality. I mentioned earlier that, for
Rancière, equality is not a goal but a presupposition. Let me explain
in greater detail what he means by that, and how it affects citizenship and citizenship education. For Rancière, equality is a fundamental and inalienable quality of persons and interpersonal
relations; it is not, and cannot be, a quality of society: “The community of equals can never achieve substantial form as a social
institution. . . . Equality may be the law of the community, but
society inevitably remains in thrall to inequality” (Rancière,
1992/1995, p. 84). Society by definition introduces inequality
because it creates order by assigning people a place and rank. This
inequality, however, can never annihilate the equality that already
exists between people and is constantly reasserted: the equality of
intelligence, of “a community of speaking beings” who, together,
invent discourse simply by wishing to speak and wishing to hear
(p. 82, 85). That, then, is the fundamental assertion of equality: By
speaking to you, I assume we are equals, me capable of saying
something intelligible, you capable of understanding what I say. Or
vice versa: By listening to you, I assume we are equals, you capable
of saying something intelligible, me capable of understanding what
you say. As soon as the people speaking and listening do so within a
social order, the inequality of their places and ranks in that
order—whether of kinship, of class, of gender or any other system
of places and ranks—begins to chafe against this fundamental
equality.
The egalitarian aspect of citizenship refers to the idea that
citizenship is not a right one earns based on age, education, or
effort; it is the aspect at an unbridgeable distance from all meritocratic systems of society. As Rancière (2004) puts it: “Democracy is
the power of those who have no specific qualification for ruling,
except the fact of having no qualification” (p. 305). This also means
that, to the extent that education is approached meritocratically,
there is a tension between the egalitarian aspect of citizenship and
the idea of citizenship education. Borrowing May’s (2011) description of the immeasurable nature of equality in Rancière’s work, I say
that the egalitarian aspect of citizenship signifies that one cannot
not be a “better” or a “worse” citizen, or a citizen in light of particular qualities, but only a citizen—period. It is the fundamental right
to speak and to be heard, to be counted. To truly believe in democracy, then, is to commit oneself to equality, in the full sense of
commitment as a faith and an enactment. Biesta (2011b) affirms
that “‘commitment’ is in this regard quite an appropriate term,” as it
involves not just a rational understanding but an emotional
involvement. “The democratic subject, so we might say, is the one
who is driven by a desire for democracy” (p. 96).
Schools, as social institutions, are by definition places of
multiple inequalities: of age and grade level, of marks and degrees.
For that reason, asserting equality in a school is no easy task (see
Ruitenberg, 2008). Insofar as citizenship education is concerned
democracy & education, vol 23, n-o 1

with equality, the school may not be the best or primary location
for such education. However, since schools remain the greatest
common denominator among children, the possibilities for
democratic citizenship education that exist within them, even if
limited, should not be discounted.4
Schools are often deeply invested in the idea of education as
preparation. For example, if citizenship is understood narrowly as
focused on voting, and youth in elementary and secondary schools
do not yet have the right to vote, then citizenship education can be
seen as preparation for the future identity of citizen. Biesta (2011b)
puts it as follows:
If . . . the ‘essence’ of democracy can . . . be expressed as a particular,
well-defined singular order, then citizenship can be understood as a
positive identity—that is, an identity that can be fully expressed and
defined—and thus civic learning can be fully understood in terms of
the acquisition of this identity by individuals. (p. 87)

From the preceding argument, it should be clear that neither Biesta
nor I believe that citizenship is an identity that can be fully
expressed and defined, or that citizenship education should be
understood as the acquisition of that identity. In order to distinguish citizenship education as preparation for a well-defined
identity of citizen from citizenship education as fostering commitment to equality, Biesta (2011b) introduces the helpful concept of
(political) subjectification, which he distinguishes from the
socialization conception of civic learning. The latter
would see the aims of civic learning first and foremost in terms of the
reproduction of an existing socio-political order and thus of the
adaptation of individuals to this order, while [the subjectification
conception of civic learning] would focus on the emergence of political
agency and thus sees the aims of civic learning first and foremost in
terms of the promotion of political subjectivity and agency. (pp. 86–87)

I have argued that citizenship education today must emphasize the
egalitarian aspect of citizenship, and this egalitarian aspect is best
served by an approach that emphasizes political subjectification, so
this subjectification conception should take center stage in the
framework with which we evaluate citizenship curriculum and
policy. How do we know whether a curriculum or policy gives
room to political subjectification? Two key features emerge. The
first is the extent to which the curriculum or policy emphasizes the
egalitarian or constitutive role of citizens, that is to say, the extent to
which it acknowledges and addresses citizenship as the democratic,
political role of holding the state to account. The second is the
extent to which the curriculum positions citizenship as something
that can be enacted now rather than something for which the
student is being prepared. These two features need to be seen in
conjunction with each other: if a curriculum or policy presents
citizenship as consisting in civic qualities such as helping one’s
neighbor, then the absence of the aspect of citizenship as constitutive force means that the emphasis on enactment in the here and
now does not become political and enforces only the submissive,
statutory aspect of citizenship. And if a curriculum or policy
Feature Article
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presents citizenship as consisting in democratic participation and
contestation but offers this idea of citizenship only as information
about historical events or as relevant to the student’s future as
full-fledged member of the polity, then the absence of opportunities to enact citizenship and experience democratic commitment
today means that the emphasis on the constitutive and egalitarian
aspect of citizenship rings hollow and remains caught in an idea of
citizenship as a predefined role.

Citizenship Curriculum in British Columbia
Let me now turn to two cases of citizenship education curriculum
and policy and see how they hold up under this theoretical lens.
While this is not a full curriculum or policy review, I hope these
two examples are illustrative of the framework I have laid out.
Under current graduation program requirements, all students
in British Columbia must complete one of the following three
courses: Social Studies 11, BC First Nations Studies 12, or Civic
Studies 11. The course that is most obviously and directly concerned with citizenship education is Civic Studies, a course that
was first implemented in BC in 2005. The official curriculum
document, known in British Columbia as the Integrated Resource
Package (IRP), states the following aims of the course:
The aim of Civic Studies 11 is to enhance students’ abilities and
willingness to participate actively and responsibly in civic life. Civic
Studies 11 offers opportunities for students to deliberate individually
and with others on civic matters—local to global—for the purpose of
becoming informed decision makers empowered in civic action. The
course is intended as a study in civics, where the study about civics is a
means to that end. Civic Studies 11 offers opportunities for students to
form reasoned views on issues, and to participate in socially relevant
projects and real-life learning for the purpose of developing civic
mindedness. This course enables students to relate their learning in
school to their civic duties and expectations, enhance their sense of
membership in society, and increase their ability to take more active
roles as citizens of Canada and the world. (British Columbia Ministry
of Education, 2005, p. 11)

One of the promising qualities of this course rationale is the
understanding that a study about civics is not enough and in this
course is considered a means to the end of a study in civics, which
includes opportunities to participate. However, the participation
that is so commendably part of the course is described in social,
not political, terms as participation in “socially relevant projects.”
While the terms democracy and democratic are used elsewhere in
the document, their absence from the course rationale is noteworthy. The civic action, civic mindedness, and citizenship that feature
so prominently in the course aims are not characterized here as
democratic. In addition, by qualifying citizenship as citizenship “of
Canada and the world,” the idea that citizenship is about belonging
to a community is emphasized.
Civic Studies 11 takes a clearly deliberative perspective on
citizenship education. This is evident not only in Civic Deliberation being one of the four sets of prescribed learning outcomes
(PLOs) (in addition to Skills and Processes of Civic Studies,
democracy & education, vol 23, n-o 1

Informed Citizenship, and Civic Action) but also in the emphasis
on deliberation in other parts of the curriculum. For example,
under Civic Action it is mentioned that students should be able to
“apply skills of civic discourse and dispute resolution, including
consensus building, negotiation, compromise, and majority rule”
(British Columbia Ministry of Education, 2005, p. 23). The concern
this deliberative angle raises is that it de-emphasizes the egalitarian, constitutive aspect of citizenship, which positions the citizen
not as rational, deliberative contributor to the state but as a critical
assessor of the state and potentially in disagreement with it.
Indeed, key to the work of Rancière, Mouffe, Balibar, and Biesta
alike is that they emphasize disagreement in democratic politics
and are critical of the deliberative approach. Balibar (1996), for
example, insists “that we not exaggerate the importance of consensus to the detriment of conflict” (p. 370). And Rancière (1995/1999)
puts it more forcefully: political activity, the disruption of a social
order, is an expression of disagreement with the imposition of
inequality and begins with the perception that equality has been
wronged.
While curriculum documents are an important source of
information about curriculum, their interpretation and use by
educators in the field can shed light not only on the areas explicitly
prioritized and emphasized in the text but also on the space left for
educators’ own priorities and emphases. Paul Orlowski taught the
Civic Studies 11 curriculum in a Vancouver high school in
2005/2006 and reflected on the experience in the article “Youth
‘Participaction’ & Democracy: Reflections on Teaching Civic
Studies 11 in British Columbia” (2008). Already an experienced
social studies teacher, Orlowski looked not for what the curriculum told him to do but what it allowed him to do. He notes that
“several of the prescribed learning outcomes in the course IRP
create the possibilities for counter-hegemonic discourses to take
root—provided the teacher holds the belief that teaching is a
political act. I am one such teacher” (p. 113). Orlowski made
enthusiastic use of these possibilities and connected the prescribed
curriculum to current political events and developments in British
Columbia, Canada, and abroad. For example, he found that “the
PLO on political ideologies gave [him] state-sanctioned permission to teach about different versions of the good citizen, as well as
current social and economic issues, in municipal, provincial,
national, and international contexts” (p. 115).
His experience teaching Civic Studies 11 was clearly positive,
and he provides several examples of the ways in which his students
fulfilled the civic action component of the course, thereby indeed
enacting citizenship as practice. In particular, he recounts how one
of his students wrote “an unsolicited speech . . . about her outrage”
at a member of Parliament who changed his party allegiance
(“crossed the floor”) after having been elected. The student then
read her speech in a public park during a political protest. This
example and Orlowski’s experience more generally suggest that the
course can create opportunities for students to become not just
rationally and deliberatively but also passionately involved in
political issues. Moreover, the student who wrote and delivered a
public speech against floor-crossing parliamentarians enacted her
equality: She clearly did not feel limited in her speech by the fact
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that she was not yet of voting age. Her speech was not about the
right to speak based on her status as citizen-voter but about the
right to speak based on her equality as citizen-participant.5
The second example is not a course curriculum but a curriculum framework called Social Responsibility (British Columbia
Ministry of Education, 2001). This framework is not mandatory, so
schools choose whether, and to what extent, they try to meet these
performance standards. The standards fall into four sets of expectations: (a) contributing to the classroom and school community,
(b) solving problems in peaceful ways, (c) valuing diversity and
defending human rights, (d) exercising democratic rights and
responsibilities (British Columbia Ministry of Education, 2001, p. 4).
The curriculum framework seems to be of two minds about citizenship. The first two sets of expectations suggest a social and personal
orientation; the latter two use the firm political language of “defending human rights” and “exercising democratic rights.” In spite of the
claim that “this framework focuses attention on the participatory
view of citizenship that is valued in Canadian policy and curriculum
documents” (British Columbia Ministry of Education, 2001, p. 5), the
dominant tone of the document is one that emphasizes social
responsibility as a desirable quality of individual students, which will
reduce problems among students and in the school more generally:
Currently the standards are being implemented in schools throughout
the province as a way of: monitoring school improvement; improving
school and classroom climate; dealing with school issues (e.g., fighting,
vandalism); enhancing subject-specific learning activities or units (e.g.,
study of the Holocaust); giving direction to leadership, service and
social justice clubs; assessing the progress of individual students. (p. 7)

There is nothing in this list that suggests a political or democratic
priority in the sense of students’ equality and their capacity to
monitor the state. It is unsurprising, therefore, that the document
identifies that its “standards for social responsibility . . . are a
continuation of the work begun in the reference sets Evaluating
Group Communication Skills Across Curriculum and Evaluating
Problem Solving Across Curriculum” (p. 5). Indeed, group communication skills and problem-solving skills, while they may be useful,
are quite different from the commitment to equality or “desire for
democracy” that are needed for democratic citizenship education.
The emphasis of the BC Social Responsibility framework on
reducing conflict and working together in one’s community is not
unique in citizenship education. Westheimer and Kahne (2004)
notice a lack of attention to the political dimension of citizenship in
many citizenship education programs and take a clear stand against
this lack: “Personal responsibility, voluntarism, and character
education must be considered in a broader social context or they
risk advancing civility or docility instead of democracy” (p. 244).
Similarly, in his analysis of Scottish citizenship education, Biesta
(2011b) observes that it reveals a social more than a political
approach to citizenship, in which the relationship of individuals to
each other and to their communities is prioritized over their
relationship to the state (p. 24). The point is not that students
should be unpleasant to each other and careless about their
communities, but I agree with Biesta that
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an almost exclusive emphasis on these aspects runs the danger that the
political dimensions of citizenship, including an awareness of the
limitations of personal responsibility for effective political action and
change, remain invisible and become unattainable for children and
young people. (p. 26)

The Social Responsibility framework emphasizes community
membership in much the same way the UK Big Society initiative
does: It encourages youth to be respectful and active members of
their neighborhoods and communities, but it remains limited to
what Westheimer and Kahne (2004) have called the “personally
responsible” and “participatory” (p. 242) conceptions of citizenship. The egalitarian, constitutive aspect of citizenship that I have
emphasized, and that fits in what Westheimer and Kahne have
called the “justice-oriented” (p. 242) conception of citizenship, is
significantly different from the neighborliness encouraged by
Social Responsibility and Big Society. Contestation of the state and
the way it orders society is entirely lacking in neighborliness, and it
is not essential or promoted in the types of social (rather than
political) participation that these approaches advance.

Conclusion
I have argued that citizenship should be understood not only in its
statutory sense but also—and, in today’s world, especially—in its
sense of the equal capacity of everybody to voice and enact
citizenship. In other words, I have argued for the strengthening of
the political and democratic aspect of citizenship in citizenship
education.
There are elements of citizenship education in elementary and
secondary schooling that are legitimately about civic socialization.
That is to say, they are concerned with citizenship in its statutory
aspect. These elements are what school curriculum has in common
with the prep guides for those who wish to become legal citizens of
a particular country. For example, Citizenship and Immigration
Canada (2014) advises those who wish to apply for Canadian
citizenship that as part of the citizenship test, they will be asked
questions on subjects such as:
the rights, freedoms and responsibilities of Canadian citizens,
Canada’s democracy and ways to take part in Canadian society,
Canadian political and military history (including the political system,
monarchy and branches of government), Canadian social and cultural
history and symbols, and Canadian physical and political geography.

This is not dissimilar from the Informed Citizenship category of the
curriculum for Civic Studies 11, which advises teachers:
It is expected that students will: demonstrate a knowledge of historical
and contemporary factors that help define Canadian civic identity . . . ;
identify historical roots of the Canadian political and legal systems;
describe the division of powers in Canada among federal, provincial,
territorial, First Nations, and municipal governments; describe
Canada’s electoral systems and processes. (British Columbia Ministry
of Education, 2005, pp. 22–23)
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The reason I say it is legitimate to include such elements of civic
socialization in the curriculum is that several studies suggest that
there is a connection between political knowledge and political
engagement. William Galston (2001) summarizes the research as
follows: “The more knowledge citizens have of civic affairs, the
less likely they are to experience a generalized mistrust of, or
alienation from, public life” and “the more likely they are to
participate in public matters” (p. 224; see also Torney-Purta,
2002). Biesta (2011b) acknowledges that “young people themselves have indicated a lack of knowledge and understanding in
this area” and that this is good reason not to dismiss entirely
some of the more traditional approaches to citizenship education
(p. 6). However—and this is a big however—if educators, curriculum designers, and educational policymakers wish to take
democratic citizenship in its democratic aspect seriously, they
must ensure that the curricular elements of civic socialization do
not overshadow the opportunities for civic subjectification. Or, to
put it in the language of Balibar: for education to take democratic
citizenship seriously in its global context today, it must place
considerably greater emphasis on the egalitarian aspect of
citizenship than it has traditionally done. This egalitarian aspect
cannot be taught in the relative tidiness of the classroom but must
include opportunities for students to enact and practice their
equal capacity as speaking beings outside of the classroom—in
the larger school community but also in social movements and in
the media. The work of the Council of Youth Research, in which
Los Angeles high school youth critically questioned politicians,
school superintendents, and policymakers, is a good example of
this (Mirra, Morrell, Cain, Scorza, & Ford, 2013).
While the egalitarian aspect of citizenship is important—and
currently arguably the most important—it is not the only aspect of
citizenship. The statutory aspect of citizenship reminds us of the
fact that citizens are also subjected to the state. The conditions of
that subjection, especially the borders that separate those who can
consider themselves a part of the state from those who cannot, are
important targets of democratic interrogation. Citizens, in the
sense of those who are recognized by the state as legitimate
members of the demos, have the ability to exert pressure on the
state on precisely this point of legitimate membership. Seyla
Benhabib (2004) has argued that “people” in the sense of ethnos
and in the sense of demos do not coincide and that the demos can
both invoke and revoke its own constitution in a process she calls
“democratic iterations” (pp. 180–181). Balibar (1996), likewise,
insists that there is a difference and “tension between the idea of
peuple as a community (Ein volk [sic] [or a people]) and the idea of
peuple as a principle of equality and social justice (das Volk [or the
people])” (p. 372). I believe that precisely this contestation of the
borders and composition of the demos must be part of citizenship
education today. Biesta (2011b) argues that “questions about the
definition of citizenship” and “a critical examination of the
conditions of young people’s citizenship” should be part of
citizenship education (p. 16). Such a self-reflective citizenship
education, a citizenship education that considers its own conditions and boundaries, would include, for example, discussion
about which members of society do not have rights as members of
democracy & education, vol 23, n-o 1

the polity. It would discuss how people can enact citizenship-as-
equality even if they have not achieved citizenship-as-status. It
would educate students about “the daily process of resistances and
vindications of basic rights on the part of the foreigners, which
make them members of an active community of citizens, even
before they are granted formal citizenship” (Balibar, 2010b, p. 320).
And it would afford students opportunities to publicly voice their
views about, or participate in, such resistances and vindications.
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